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1 INTRODUCTION
The IMF and the World Bank emerged 50 years ago
as a result of the deliberations at Bretton Woods.
Those who attended that conference - thinkers,
civil servants and political leaders - showed unu-
sual imagination and boldness in designing a new
monetary system intended to prevent a recurrence
of the devastating economic and subsequently po-
litical developments that followed the first world
war Bretton Woods was in a sense the antithesis of
Versailles; the punitive treatment of the losers at
Versailles was matched, but in mirror image, by
the generosity of spirit of Bretton Woods together
with the Marshall and Dodge Plans.' The inten-
tions of those at Bretton Woods were realised: the
post-war system did not see a return to the eco-
nomic recession and mass unemployment of the
1930s; international restrictions were greatly
reduced and trade and output expanded at an
unprecedented rate.
Today, however, the Bretton Woods institutions
are badly in need of reform, for three rather differ-
ent reasons: first, in some important respects the
international financial institutions (IFIs) have
moved away from the intentions of the founders;
second, the world today is radically different from
what it was in 1945, so that the institutions de-
signed for that era do not meet the needs of the
21st century; third, the governance structures of the
institutions, never really satisfactory, seem par-
ticularly ill-suited to both today's political reali-
ties and democratic aspirations. In this article,
I argue that without substantial reform, the IFIs
risk becoming at best irrelevant and at worst
dysfunctionaL
It was probably no accident that Keynes played an important
role in both conferences, but while his ideas were not adopted at
Versailles - leading to his devastatingly critical (and perceptive)
essay 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' - he was deter-
mined things would be different after the Second World War and
at Bretton Woods his ideas were more closely followed.
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2 THE WORLD IN 1945 AND BRETTON
WOODS
The world economy of 1945 was a war economy:
one of almost completely controlled trade; non-
convertible currencies; a Europe devastated by war,
which lacked hard currency to buy goods from the
one economy which had spare capacity (the US).
The memory of recession and unemployment of the
1930s was still vivid as was the process by which the
economic problems following the first world war
had led to horrendous political consequences. At
the same time, the laissez-faire and monetarist eco-
nomic philosophy prevalent between the wars had
been displaced in official thinking by the much more
interventionist views of Keynes. Those who partici-
pated at Bretton Woods not only had a very strong
motive to avoid the post First World War events,
but they also had a new system of thought and
well-worked out mechanisms to help them do so.2
Two fundamental objectives of the Bretton Woods
system emerge clearly from the Articles of Agree-
ment of the IMF: to promote high levels of employ-
ment and real income, and to enhance world trade,
by reducing restrictions on trade, currency convert-
ibility etc., as indicated in the first of the Fund's
Articles of Agreement:
to facilitate the expansion of balanced growth in
international trade, and to contribute thereby to
the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the devel-
opment of the productive resources of all mem-
bers as primary objectives of economic policy.
The employment and output oleclive, perhaps, most
clearly reflects Keynes' influence; the emphasis on
-
2 J.M.Keynes, Proposals for an International Currency Union',
8/9/1941; 18/11/1941; 15/12/41; 'Plans for an International
Currency (Or Clearing) Union', paras. 61 to 134 of the Treasury
Memorandum on External Monetary and Economic problems,
31/3/1942; White Paper on the International Monetary Fund, 7th
April 1943; Joint statement by experts on the establishment of the
International Monetary Fund, 22/4/1944. These are all published
in D.Moggridge (ed.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard
Keynes, XXV, 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
trade liberalization that of Harry White and the
American contingent. But both were believed to be
connected and necessary to lay the foundations for
growing prosperity in the post-war world.
The ¡FIs were established to help carry out these
functions: the ¡MF to oversee currency matters and
to contribute to reduced currency and trade restric-
tions; and the World Bank to provide funds and
technical advice to promote reconstruction in Eu-
rope and development elsewhere. The governance
of the two institutions reflected the economic and
political power of 1945 - with the US as the major
economic power in the driving seat and a signifi-
cant position for Europe. The Third World, then
almost non-existent as an independent political
entity, was ignored.
The initial design of the two institutions was not
strictly appropriate to achieve either of the two
fundamental objectives. Once reconstruction had
been achieved, support for high employment and
output required coordination of economic policies
among governments representing countries with
economic weight in the world and some ability to
inject additional finance into the system at the
international level when required. Yet, Keynes'
'bancor' which would have achieved the latter was
rejected, and the IMF was given only mild coordi-
nating powers. As far as trade was concerned, it
was the Marshall Plan and later GATT and the
European Economic Community rather than the
¡FIs which were principally responsible for the
reductions of restrictions on trade, exchange and
capital movements.
3 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD
ECONOMIC SYSTEM SINCE 1945
As might have been expected, the world economy
has changed radically since 1945 - partly due to the
Bretton Woods system itself; partly to successive
trade rounds; partly to political changes; and
partly to technological transformation. Important
changes, relevant to the role of the IFIs, include:
the emergence of Third World countries as
independent states;
C. Oman quoted in D. Chai, 1993, 'Structural adjustment,
global integration and social democracy' in D. Prendergast and
F. Stewart (eds.) Market Forces and World Development
(London: Macmillan).
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the establishment of foreign exchange convert-
ibility; greatly reduced restrictions on trade and
capital movements, first among developed countries
and more recently among developing countries;
following reduced regulation, there was a mas-
sive expansion of both trade and international
capital movements. World economic growth was
2.75 per cent p.a. from 1950-90, while international
trade grew over twice as fast. Private international
capital movements have expanded throughout the
period, with a particular boost in the 1970s through
the recycling of oil-finance; and the 1980s with
deregulation;
the role of multinational companies in world
trade and investment greatly increased. By the early
1980s, trade within and between the 350 largest
TNCs amounted to an estimated 40 per cent of
global trade.3 Global sales of foreign affiliates in
host countries are estimated to have grown by 15
per cent per annum, 1985-1990, much faster than the
growth in domestic output.4
following succedful reconstruction in Europe
and Japan, and sustained development in many
Third World countries, economic power has spread
much more widely, greatly diminishing the
hegemonic position of the US.
the end of the Cold War and the emergence of
'transition' as a major economic and political chal-
lenge has radically changed both political and
economic maps;
the Keynesian economic philosophy that domi-
nated at Bretton Woods was displaced, notably
from the late 1970s, by a return to belief in the market
model and monetarism as the predominant phi-
losophy in industrialized countries and the IFIs,
a change which was reinforced by the collapse
of communism.
4 NEW OBJECTIVES
As noted above, the major objectives that informed
Bretton Woods were high levels of employment
and the establishment of a prosperous world
United Nations, 1992, World Investment report: Trans-
national Corporations as Engines of Growth (New York: United
Nations).
economy based on the promotion of free movement
of goods, services and capital. In the event, in the
first 20 years after the system was initiated, the
developed countries achieved full employment
and their major economic problem then appeared
to be inflation rather than unemployment. Sub-
sequently, when unemployment reemerged in the
industrial countries and underemployment emerged
as a growing problem in developing countries, the
IFIs seemed to have lost sight of the employment
objective, placing excessive emphasis on inflation
control, sometimes at the expense of employment
and output. This was partly due to the emerging
dominance of the renewed monetarist philosophy.
Since 1945, other important objectives for the world
economic system have gained prominence, partly
as a by-product of the changes that occurred and
partly in response to fresh political pressures. These
include:
Development of Third World countries (and
now promotion of successful transition). The World
Bank took this objective on as its major remit at an
early stage.
Elimination of poverty. At first, it was believed
this would be the automatic outcome of develop-
ment, but as the failure of 'trickle down' became
apparent, Basic Needs was accepted as an objective
by the World Bank, soon to be displaced, however,
by adjustment. In the 1990s, poverty reduction has
again emerged as an important world objective.
Problems of the unregulated market system for
the environment, at many levels (ranging from
soil erosion in particular villages to the world
greenhouse effect), have given growing weight to
environmental considerations and the objective of
sustainable development.
Finally, because the employment objective so
clearly enunciated at Bretton Woods was neglected,
it has become necessary to reintroduce high levels
of employment as an objective, both in developed
and developing countries.5
It is significant that the World Bank's 1995 World Develop-
ment Report is devoted to employment, while the ILO has pub-
lished its first World Employment Report in 1995.
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5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGES IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY AND NEW OBJECTIVES
FOR THE IFIs
In principle, government supported international
institutions should provide the collective action that
is necessary to promote world welfare, which nei-
ther governments acting on their own, nor the
market would provide. This sort of collective action
is needed because there are externalities arising
from certain types of action of governments (and
companies, or individuals operating through the
market). Because of free rider problems and de-
ficiencies in information, only collective action
will bring about the desired results.
The changes in the world economy and the new
objectives just noted have strong implications for
the type of collective action that is needed and also
the effectiveness of the existing IFIs in promoting it.
On the one hand, it might be (and indeed has been)6
argued that there is no longer a role for the IFIs
for the following reasons:
they have been marginalized in capital move-
ments, accounting for only a small fraction of the
total capital that crosses frontiers (and indeed in the
1980s when most needed they actually received
resources rather than paying them out). Countries,
other than the very poor and those lacking in credit
worthiness, now have access to private capital
markets and don't need the World Bank;
when there are major problems with interna-
tional capital - eg. in both the Mexico crises (1982
and 1995) - the IFIs were in effect bypassed, brought
in only to endorse prior decisions. Much the same
is true of lending to some of the countries in transi-
tion, especially Russia. In the 1980s, the Brady
'solution' to the debt crisis was provided by the
US Secretary for the Treasury and not by the IFIs;
they are unable to deal with the problems of the
poorest countries. After over a decade of 'adjust-
ment' African per ca pita incomes are still falling;
budgets and trade balances are still in deficit;
debt has escalated; and the tragedy of ethnic strife
has grown;
6 e.g. by Alan Walters, 1994, 'Do we need the IMF and the World
Bank?' (London: Institute of Economic Affairs).
aid fatigue in the developed countries is likely to
lessen soft transfers to poor countries, who cannot
afford IBRD type lending and have very limited
access to private capital markets, further reducing
the role of the World Bank. Moreover, aid is not a
solution to most of their problems: commodity prices
and debt are of greater importance and the IFIs have
shown themselves incapable of dealing with either;
the dismantling of trade and currency restric-
tions which was so important a part of the original
remit of the IFIs has been successful, while the WTO
will take on further action on trade leaving a limited
role for the IFIs;
full employment is still, as noted, an important
objective but one that has long been forgotten by
the IFIs;
coordination between the major economic
powers, if it occurs at all, takes place via meetings of
the G7, not through the IFIs;
With their present form and governance, the IFIs
seem incapable of dealing with the new objectives
and new problems of the world economy. Environ-
mental issues are dealt with at special meetings
and conventions; the strictly pro-market budget-
balance philosophy debars the IFIs from dealing
effectively with employment or poverty.
Yet, the new problems are global problems, needing
global solutions. Ironically, they are largely prob-
lems of excessive rather than deficient markets -
hence part of the difficulties for the IFIs in dealing
with these problems, given their strong belief in the
market. For example, it has become clear that the
unregulated capital market can lead to dangerous
fluctuations in capital movements, playing havoc
with economic management and development, as
in Mexico.7 Some international regulation, and per-
haps taxation, is needed. Similarly, some world
regulation is needed to prevent exploitation and
tax avoidance by TNCs. Competition in promoting
supplies between poor countries, (currently encour-
aged by the IFIs), leads to falling commodity prices
It is worth noting that this danger was foreseen by Keynes and
the initial remit for the IMF did not include relaxation of capital
controls.
For example, Ghana's large increase in cocoa exports (in vol-
ume) was more than offset by declining world prices in the
1980s, so foreign exchange earnings from cocoa fell.
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(also of labour-intensive manufactures) sometimes
so sharply that the result is immiserizing growth.8
Unregulated trade competition can also lead coun-
tries to compete by eliminating labour standards,
encouraging child labour, avoiding environmental
regulations, etc.
Global institutions are needed not only to promote
the new objectives but also to react to the excesses
resulting from the market reforms.
The functions Global Financial Institutions (GFIs)9
should have as the century ends derive from current
global objectives noted above and the problems
that have emerged from an unregulated global mar-
ket. Each function arises from the special needs
for collective action at a global level, and relates
to issues that cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at
a national level.
The discussion above suggests the following as the
main functions of global financial institutions de-
signed to meet the need for global collective action:
Coordination of macroeconomic policy among
the main economic powers, so as to secure a steady
expansion of world output and promotion of
employment.
Renewed use of the SDR as a source of additional
liquidity, to be used (a) to supplement world re-
serves and world demand when deemed necessary
to avoid deflation; and (b) to support the finance
of adjustments in poor developing countries and
countries in transition.
Supervision and regulation of capital markets,
including administration of a 'Tobin' tax on capital
transactions;
Supervision and regulation of multinational
companies, including developing and administer-
ing anti-trust legislation at a global level; devel-
opment and administration of codes of conduct;
development and administration of taxation of
multinational companies;
I use the term Global Financial Institution (GFls) to indicate
that these would be radically different from existing IFIs, though
they might evolve from them.
Development of global environmental stand-
ards; mechanisms of enforcement; monitoring.
S. Development and monitoring of a World Social
Charter, covering basic social rights, including ac-
cess to basic goods and services and the elimination
of poverty; financial flows would be used to sup-
port the achievement of the rights embodied in the
World Social Charter and social conditionality would
be used as a lever to secure appropriate domestic
action.
S Development of appropriate environmental and
labour standards, with the standards varying with
the level of income of the country.
Monitoring trends in commodity prices and de-
vising policies, including producer taxes coordi-
nated across countries, to help reduce excess sup-
plies and downward movement in prices. 10
The list of functions to be performed by the GFIs is
a preliminary one, which would be added to (and
subtracted from) as the institutions develop and
new needs emerge.
GFIs with these functions would be playing the role
that public institutions ought to play viz, compen-
sating for externalities and market imperfections
that occur at a world level and helping meet world
economic objectives. But it is unrealistic to expect
that the present IFIs could be readily transformed
into the proposed GFIs, without first reforming
their governance.
6 REFORM IN GOVERNANCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
The first requirement for any reform is a radical
change in governance. The reformed mandate pro-
posed above is unlikely to work without a parallel
change in governance. There are two major prob-
lems with IFIs' present governance - the level of
decision maker involved and the composition and
voting structure of their Boards of Governors. The
level is too low, and hence when governments wish
to take serious decisions they convene Ministerial
meetings. The voting structure of the Boards is too
heavily weighted to the industrial powers and fails
This was intended to be the function of the abortive Interna-
tional Trade Organization which emerged from Bretton Woods. It
should be emphasized that the ITO functions then proposed are
quite different from those allocated to the WTO at present,
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to give sufficient weight to others (developing coun-
tries; countries in transition) who are all seriously
affected by their actions, and would be more so with
the proposed reforms in mandates to be considered
below. While the IFIs are formally part of the UN
system, they operate independently of the UN and
are not regarded as genuinely world institutions,
but rather they tend to be viewed as the instruments
of the major industrial countries.
Reformed Governance: I would propose to allocate
power over the IFIs to a newly formed Economic
and Social Security Council (ESSC) at the UN, par-
allel to the Security Council, but with responsibility
for economic and social matters. Like the present
Security Council, the ESSC would be composed of
some permanent members and also representative
countries from the rest of the world. The perma-
nent members would include the major economic
powers in the world (US, Japan, Europe, China);
revolving membership would include representa-
tives of all other parts of the world. Majorities of
three-quarters would be needed for decision mak-
ing, the composition of the Council being such that
no single category of country could secure a three-
quarters majority. Hence the ESSC would (like the
Security Council) be much more comprehensive
than the G7, but its representation would allow
for greater weight to be given to more powerful
countries, to reflect the realities of power and
decision making in the world.
The ESSC would make the most important decisions
concerning world collective action ort economic and
social matters, including defining the objectives of
the Global Financial Institutions (GFIs), and provid-
ing them with overall guidance, and deciding when
institutional reform was needed. The ESSC could
call for changes by national governments (although
these would not be binding). The GFIs would con-
tinue to have their own Boards, but these would be
responsible to the ESSC as the major world eco-
nomic decision making body. The ESSC would meet
regularly to oversee world economic development,
review progress and identify changes in national
and international policies; emergency meetings
would be convened during a world economic crisis.
The ESSC would attempt to devise solutions to
critical problems or request the GFIs to do so.
Functions of the proposed global financial institutions
Function ESSC Reformed
IMF
Reformed
WB
Reformed
WTO
Present
system
Supervise
capital
movements
Overall
policy
+
Supervise
tax
O O BIS/IMF poorly
and ad hoc
Global
environmental
regulations
Overall
policy
making
O +
Regulations
devised
+
Regulations
monitored
ad hoc
Social
objectives
Overall
policy
making -
devise social
charter
+
Adapt
policies
+
Social
conditionality
O UNICEF/UNDP/
ECOSOC with
insufficient
effects
Domestic
environment
and labour
standards
Overall
policies -
guidelines
O O +
Use of trade
weapon
No-one for
environment
lLO for labour
Commodity
policies
Overall
policies
+
Support
policies with
finance and
administration
+
Support
policies with
diversific
projects
O UNCTAD once;
no-one now
Macro-policy
coordination
+
Main
venue
+
Analytic
support
O O Ad hoc, 07
SDRs and
demand
Overall
policies
+ O O IMF - but too
limited
This structure of governance would enhance
participation in world economic decision making;
and place the GFIs firmly within the United
Nations, under the direction of a political body,
the ESSC.
The matrix below indicates the role of the ESSC
and how the proposed functions might be allocated
as between the existing IFIs. The functions extend
beyond 'finance' strictly speaking (as do the actions
of the existing IFIs). For some functions (e.g. envi-
ronment) there might be a case for developing a
new institution rather than allocating the function
to an existing institution. But for present purposes
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it is assumed that the functions would be performed
by one or other of the three existing institutions
(IMF, WB, WTO).
7 A NEW ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY
The new allocation of functions proposed above
would not be workable if the IFIs retained their
present rather rigid market-oriented and anti-
Keynesian philosophy. Modern economics pro-
vides a rich menu of reasons why this simple mar-
ket philosophy is incorrect, justification for public
action and alternative ways of thinking about
economic development more generally. These
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alternatives are supported by a large amount of
empirical work showing how real markets, insti-
tutions and economies operate. The new institu-
tions will not succeed unless they are open to alter-
native approaches and ways of thinking. Strong
political direction will be necessary to bring about
such a change in thought, as well as appointments of
open-minded people at the highest levels in these
institutions. A change in recruitment procedures
and, perhaps, in location might also be helpful. The
institutions need to be much more open to dialogue
with others with different views; and, in country
work, to views of governments and citizens.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The IFIs are becoming marginalized in world eco-
nomic decision making and capital flows. The half-
century and also the millennium provide a good
opportunity to rethink their mandates. Three options
are possible: to close them down as being no longer
relevant to the present world; to let them continue
to react to events, which may be useful to the
achievement of policy objectives of industrialized
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countries, but makes little contribution to global
problems, and may indeed make some problems
worse, by reducing public action and giving an
excessive role to the market; or to undertake radical
reform to enable the institutions to respond to pre-
sent global economic and social issues. The last
seems clearly preferable, but also most difficult to
achieve, since no powerful countries are sufficiently
alarmed by present problems to want major re-
forms. The unregulated movement of international
capital and goods or global environmental damage
will have seriously to threaten interests in the pow-
erful countries before major institutional change
becomes likely. In the meantime piecemeal reform,
in response to particular crises, is most likely with
a continued gradual erosion of the importance of the
IFIs. Neither a 50 year birthday, nor the ushering
in of a new century are likely to be enough, in
themselves, to induce radical reform. But the global
problems which provide the justification for reform
are real and growing; without reform the dys-
functionality of the current system is likely to
become increasingly apparent.
